The Evolution of modes of control

Larry Boothe
Blog Post #8
Michael Foucault; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
Chapter 4: Part 2 (Illegality and Delinquency)

In Part 2 of Chapter 4, Foucault points out the similarities in the evolution of techniques used to alter individual behavior. In this context he describes the transition from the public spectacle of chain-gangs to the penal detention used in the mobile, Panopticon-like police carriage. Chain gangs were public spectacles where criminals were paraded throughout a city, and it combined the two modes of punishment Foucault has already described: detention and torture. He explains this when he states that “the way to detention unfolded as a ceremonial of torture.” However, this did not have the intended effects on the prisoners nor the populace. Some prisoners developed a collective identity of determination, and formed a companionship that reversed the intended moral code. The chain gangs seemed to give convicts a symbolic outlet; although they were defeated by the law, they were united together and expressed the idea that liberty would one day return to them. Obviously, this required the populace to choose between the ruthlessness of the executioners and misfortune of the convicts or the guilt of these convicts who proclaimed a promising message. It is easy to imagine why the powers that be chose to eliminate chain gangs in favor of more secretive administrative methods such as the police carriage. This affected the prisoners internally because they could not communicate, leaving introspection the only possible activity. When one is only left with their own thoughts they will reflect more on their wrong doing, become less inclined to disobey in the future, and become more susceptible to control. This new method of control also affected the prisoners externally because the public is now given only the gloomy sight of the convicts being detained and hauled away. This was a major difference from the sight of the defiant and joyous criminals in the chain gangs. Overall, this transition from torture, to chain gangs, to the police-carriage shows that modes of punishment were a technical mutation centering on control. This control is not only intended to affect the mindset of the prisoner but of the public as well. Foucault describes how the human race has realized over time that administrative secrecy and the formation of prisons were, and still are the best way to achieve both of these goals.

Docile bodies

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #7

Michael Foucault; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison

Part III: Discipline

Foucault begins Part 3 by focusing on the body and how it had been subjected to discipline and control rather than torture in the 18^th Century. During this time, the docility (or willingness to be taught) of the body became the central aim of methods seeking control. These methods, called disciplines, were aimed at domination through constant subjugation and fixation of individuals’ space and time. Disciplines imposed a relation of docility-utility on the operations of the body. Institutions such as schools, armies, and prisons acted as machines for controlling people. For example, a soldier’s day is divided into segments telling him what to do and when to do it. He is taught to hold his head high, stand upright, look forward, etc. By controlling space and time (both fundamental elements of human life), the way people think and act is deeply affected. These methods of coercion (disciplines) produce docile bodies. It seems that almost every institution we have today is a result of this “enlightened” way of thinking. Schools, businesses, and most organizations act as machines aimed at transforming people, in terms of utility (mostly economic). They aim to control the docility of the individual in hopes that this will increase production. The mechanism of these institutions makes the body “more obedient as it becomes more useful.” Ultimately, controlling the space and time of an individual is an extremely effective strategy for domination. By controlling the operations of the body (rather than the body itself, such is done with force) without forcing obedience to another person, the individual’s utility can increase.

of Total (totalitarian) domination

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #6

Hannah Arendt; Origins of Totalitarianism

Chapter III; Totalitarianism in Power

Arendt describes the concept of total (totalitarian) domination and its relation to the movement itself. Totalitarian domination is just one form of domination that attempts to achieve it’s goals through “ideological indoctrination” and “absolute terror”. This total domination is only possible if each individual is reduced to a “never-changing identity of reactions” so that they lose all spontaneity and individuality. This was the goal of the concentration camps in Nazi Germany. The human psyche is killed from the inside, without destroying the physical man, so that individuality and character become non-existent. The end result is “inanimate man”, or man who is incapable of being psychologically understood. If, as Arendt claims, the fundamental belief of totalitarianism is that “everything is possible”, then it is not surprising that total domination accompanies totalitarianism. There is no possible way to deprive man of something that comes with human freedom and life, (spontaneity, individuality) without resorting to total domination. Therefore, total domination is necessary to perpetuate the totalitarian state, because, without it, organization of the masses into one unit is impossible.

A Classless Society; The Masses

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #5

Hannah Arendt, Totalitarianism: Part Three of the Origins of Totalitarianism

Chapter 1: A Classless Society; The Masses

Like the regimes of Hitler and Stalin, most totalitarian movements are associated with the significance and influence of a great leader. However, Arendt would contend, more accurately, that it is the masses who are truly significant and responsible for perpetuating a totalitarian movement. The leader is a mere “functionary” of the masses he leads; he can be replaced by the will of the masses and is a nonentity without them. Arendt describes a totalitarian movement as mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals who, for one reason or another, acquired an appetite for political organization. They are not organized into classes or citizens with opinions about politics; rather they are usually apolitical, indifferent members of society who never go to the polls or join a party. They place themselves outside of the party system and present arguments based on deep psychological or social sources beyond the power of reason. The masses in a totalitarian regime are groups of dissatisfied and isolated individuals who become selfless and committed to no one or nothing but the party. All social ties, whether family, friends, or acquaintances, cease to exist and the individual gets his sense of place in the world only from his membership in the party. This unfaltering loyalty is the psychological basis for domination, and it must be created for the movement to survive.

It seems that in order for a totalitarian movement to succeed, a mass of people adopt the mindset that they are superior to others who are not in the movement, whether they are outside the country or internal. Almost as if they are striving to achieve a higher cause which members of democracies or other forms of government are incapable of doing because of their biological, moral, or some other form of inferiority. The leader is responsible for instilling this mindset in them, whether it be artificially or naturally. By appealing to a group who is frustrated and distant from politics, membership in a totalitarian movement gives people a sense of purpose and an escape from the lack of personal accomplishment in their lives.

Marx, Chapter II: Proletariats and Communists

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #4

Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto

Chapter II: “Proletariats and Communists”

Marx contends that, most important to a Communist society, there is a need to abolish private property. However, he distinguishes property acquired directly through a man’s labor from bourgeois private property. The first kind of property, Marx claims, hardly exists because it has already been abolished by industry. The only “property” belonging to the proletariat is based on the exploitation of capital and wage labor. Wage labor simply creates capital which, in turn, is the “property” that exploits wage labor. This is the property of the bourgeoisie. Bourgeoisie private property is described as, “the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few”(805). Thus, in a capitalist society the bourgeoisie own all means of production, preventing the proletariat from having any way to provide for himself. In a pure Communist society all business and industry would be owned by the people, or nationalized, for the benefit of the citizen and party alone. While this lifestyle does seem ideal, it doesn’t seem to take into account the individual, along with his culture, religion, and ideology. Marx’s narrow focus is on the economic theme of class struggle. The lifestyle would be hard to maintain because the proletariat would be more vulnerable to exploitation than before. He would be completely dependent on the machine itself rather than the products of the machine. Once labor can no longer be converted to capital, the individuality of the person vanishes. A cultureless society would emerge. This would surely not endure for a long time until some one, or group, would dissent and challenge the party’s views. Since everyone is equal and can not subjugate another there would be no way to calm dissenters, and regime change would be very easy.

Rousseau: Of the state of nature and the first societies

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #3

Rousseau- On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right

Chapters I and II; “Of the First Societies”

Rousseau asserts that social order is a sacred right, forming the basis for all other rights; however, this right does not come from nature. The only society originating in nature is the family. Here children owe obedience to the father and he owes protection to them, but even this relationship is dissolved when these needs cease to exist. If they continue to remain together it is not natural, but by means of convention. Thus, Rousseau is telling us that neither a legitimate society nor political authority are products of nature, as theorists such as John Locke would contend. Since man (an individual) alone knows what is in his best interest, and he is the judge of the means of taking care of himself, then the only “natural” and legitimate political authority can be himself. Anything else is by convention and illegitimate. However, I disagree with Rousseau’s contention that social order does not come from nature. While the family might represent the first, most ancient, example of a society founded in nature, it is by no means the only one. As Locke suggests, when a family (or individual) acquires property and goods for survival, others with less property will make efforts to take it. To prevent this, man is driven into a society to join a “social contract” with others who have the same motivation. The purpose of this society is to function, as one unit, in judging the proper means of taking care of itself and protecting its’ overall well being. These are the same functions that Rousseau claims are natural and necessary for one to be his own master. Therefore, it seems that social order itself is not natural, but its foundations come from the natural instinct of man to protect his own interests and property. The motivation to enter into a society rests in nature.

John Locke and the origins of prerogative

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #2

John Locke- Second Treatise of Civil Government, “Of Prerogative”

Locke contends that above all things an executive, or “prince” needs to avoid, an abuse of executive prerogative is foremost. Executive prerogative refers to “the power to act according to discretion for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it.” This privilege is not a right of the leader, but a trust placed in him by the people. The leader only has as much power (privilege) as the people invest in him. When the leader abuses this power, which was never even placed in his hands, then it is the natural right of the people to “appeal to heaven” when the majority judge it to be necessary. Locke contends that executive prerogative is most threatening when a successor to a successful leader claims the same freedoms and rights based on precedent. This, he says, is most dangerous to the liberties of the people, because it is difficult to recover power once it has been given away. Although this might have applied to the uninformed populous of 17^th century England, I don’t believe it to be the case in modern day America. When a president tries to accrue too much power through the executive privilege doctrine, the people are quick to take notice. Executive privilege came into the spotlight after president Nixon made the most blatant overreach of presidential powers in history during the early 1970s. Following Watergate, the public was outraged and impeachment was unavoidable. The following administrations of Ford and Carter were two of the most passive in US history, rarely ever invoking executive privilege.₁ Not until nearly 30 years later and the unique nature of the attacks on 9/11 has any president even attempted to use executive privilege on the same scale as the Nixon administration. The point is that the executive office is more transparent than in the past, so the public can plainly see when a president is overreaching his powers and abusing his executive privilege. Does this indicate that perhaps other factors, particularly crisis or war, serve as the most common and acceptable precursors to an excess of executive prerogative in today’s society?

₁ Rudalevige, Andrew. “The World after Watergate: The Resurgence Regime Takes Shape.” The New Imperial Presidency. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005. 106