Rousseau: Of the state of nature and the first societies

Larry Boothe

Blog Post #3

Rousseau- On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right

Chapters I and II; “Of the First Societies”

Rousseau asserts that social order is a sacred right, forming the basis for all other rights; however, this right does not come from nature. The only society originating in nature is the family. Here children owe obedience to the father and he owes protection to them, but even this relationship is dissolved when these needs cease to exist. If they continue to remain together it is not natural, but by means of convention. Thus, Rousseau is telling us that neither a legitimate society nor political authority are products of nature, as theorists such as John Locke would contend. Since man (an individual) alone knows what is in his best interest, and he is the judge of the means of taking care of himself, then the only “natural” and legitimate political authority can be himself. Anything else is by convention and illegitimate. However, I disagree with Rousseau’s contention that social order does not come from nature. While the family might represent the first, most ancient, example of a society founded in nature, it is by no means the only one. As Locke suggests, when a family (or individual) acquires property and goods for survival, others with less property will make efforts to take it. To prevent this, man is driven into a society to join a “social contract” with others who have the same motivation. The purpose of this society is to function, as one unit, in judging the proper means of taking care of itself and protecting its’ overall well being. These are the same functions that Rousseau claims are natural and necessary for one to be his own master. Therefore, it seems that social order itself is not natural, but its foundations come from the natural instinct of man to protect his own interests and property. The motivation to enter into a society rests in nature.